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The capability to produce a secure, reliable form of identification on request is taken for granted by many
citizens, especially those living in countries with advanced economies.  This capability provides numerous
development benefits for individuals, from accessing government and business services to establishing their
right of residence and employment in a region.  Furthermore, nationwide use of reliable means of identification
can help to combat crime and illegal immigration.  Efforts to introduce identity verification services in Nigeria
have been presented by policymakers as an intervention that would lead to a wide range of such development
outcomes.  However, these benefits are proving difficult to realize.  The use of identity smart cards aims to
improve the current situation in which most Nigerian citizens do not possess reliable means of identifying
themselves by, say, an international passport or driving license.  Although IS research is well aware that the
provision of a service does not of itself deliver development outcomes, the nature and role of ICT-based
services in development is not well understood.  Therefore, this research contributes in two ways.  First, it
directly addresses the relationship between ICTs and development policies and outcomes, with which much IS
research engages minimally or not at all.  Second, it explains citizens’ suspicion of the intervention in Nigeria
and then uses secondary data from more successful cases to address the question of why some countries
achieve desired development outcomes from the provision of identity verification services while others do not.
Keywords:  Social mechanism, trust, distrust, suspicion, ambivalence, national identity cards, comparative
study, socioeconomic development, financial reform, generative mechanism
Introduction1
Identity verification is a necessary and legitimate requirement
to enable individuals to claim their right to live and work in
a region, and gain access to important services such as
banking and loans.  Within the more affluent societies, this
requirement is often met by an international passport or
driving license (Whitley et al. 2014).  However, in countries
where the majority of citizens live on a couple of dollars a
day, ownership of such documents is rare and hence secure,
reliable means of identification may not be in widespread use. 
In these circumstances, crime and illegal immigration can
flourish, and individuals may encounter obstacles when trying
to access important and valued services (World Bank 2014).
In this context, the national identity card is an alternative form
of identity verification favored by many governments. 
National identity cards are in use in more than 100 countries
worldwide (Privacy International 2011).  Such schemes
operate in developed and developing countries (DCs),
although some are voluntary in the sense that citizens do not
need to carry or even possess the official identity card.  In
general, most DCs have identity cards and they are com-
pulsory (ibid.).  Often, policymakers directly link the use of
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ICT-based identity verification with socioeconomic develop-
ment opportunities for their citizens.  Such claims may state
that the use of identity cards will widen access to consumer
credit and job opportunities, and improve health and pension
planning (for example, NIMC 2009).
However, the gap between production of the strategy docu-
ment for the service and the realization of development
outcomes is vast.  National identity verification systems entail
considerable technical and managerial challenges in their
implementation and use.  Crucially, though, there is signi-
ficant global debate about both the potential of such systems
to address the societal challenges outlined above and the
implications for registrants’ civil liberties as a result of their
deployment (Allonby 2009; Ramakumar 2010; Whitley and
Hosein 2010b).  In practice, outcomes are mixed, socio-
economic development is uneven, and some countries have
very poor records with implementing IS innovations (Avgerou
2008; Heeks 2002).  Notable successes, such as the Estonian
identity card system (Whitley and Hosein 2010a), contrast
sharply with other countries’ frustrated attempts to develop
substantial ICT capabilities and infrastructures to support
their public services and major industries.  Furthermore, the
relationship between ICT success and the development
policies and achievements in the countries concerned is not
well understood.  Mechanism-based research, which seeks to
explain such diverse outcomes when attempting similar inter-
ventions in different contexts (McGrath 2013; Pawson 2000),
has significant potential for addressing these enduring
concerns.
The focus of this paper is on three case studies of national
identity verification systems and the development of a
mechanism-based account to explain the outcomes achieved
in each case.  The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows.  The next section outlines the importance of trust and
distrust in explaining the implementation outcomes from
identity verification systems.  A narrative description of three
empirical case studies of such systems is then provided.  In
the analysis section, the issue of how trust and distrust were
manifested in each case, as ambivalence or suspicion, and the
mechanisms that account for such manifestations are ad-
dressed.  Finally, a summary of the implications of the work
and an outline for further research directions is presented.
Accounting for the Outcomes of
Implementing Identity Verification
National identity verification systems are not uniform in
nature.  Aside from the consideration of whether possession
and use of the identity card is compulsory or voluntary, such
systems can be paper-based or adopt smart card technology;
they may (or may not) incorporate biometrics, such as facial
images, fingerprints, iris scans, or DNA information; they can
be based on a single unique identifier for each individual or
a range of such identifiers; and the data captured may be
stored in a centralized database or held in several regional or
departmental databases which are not harmonized2 (Whitley
and Hosein 2010a).  Implementation decisions such as these
affect the extent to which the systems are perceived to erode
civil liberties and present security challenges for govern-
ments.
For example, in 2010, India began the process of creating the
world’s largest biometric database, complete with fingerprints
and iris scans of its 1.2 billion citizens and residents (Yadav
2013).  Each person is being allocated a unique identifier
(UID) which provides access to a wide range of benefits and
services.  Although advised that enrollment is voluntary, indi-
viduals have discovered that their UID is necessary to
get food in the public distribution system, to get
work, to get cooking gas, to receive scholarships and
pensions, to open and operate bank accounts, to
register marriages, in rental agreements and sales
deeds and wills (Ramanathan 2014).
Consequently, the poor especially have little option but to en-
roll.  Identity verification systems such as this, which employ
smart cards, biometrics, and data harmonization, and whose
use is compulsory (in law or of necessity), are especially
contentious because of both their surveillance potential and
the security threat posed by using a single identifier to access
huge volumes of data.  While such systems are being intro-
duced in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South
America, and Asia, including the Indian subcontinent, they
have been opposed on the grounds of violating civil liberties,
and ultimately rejected, in common law countries such as the
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia
(Whitley and Hosein 2010a; World Bank 2014).  The picture
is mixed in continental Europe where the systems have sup-
port in Estonia and Moldova, but are curtailed by strong data
protection laws in other countries, such as Germany, where
biometric smart cards are compulsory but legislation prevents
the creation of a central database (Whitley and Hosein 2010a).
Clearly, public perceptions are important to the success of
such systems.  Enrollment and verification are complex tasks
2Contrary to centralized or harmonized databases, accessing personal data
held in nonharmonized databases requires knowledge of multiple identifiers
and the relationships among them.
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in themselves, which will be threatened further if registrants’
suspicion of government is such that they try to avoid en-
rolling or manipulate the verification processes.  Indeed, their
developmental potential notwithstanding, it is realistic to
expect some distrust of such systems, given the surveillance
opportunities and security issues they present.  Hence,
building trust has been identified as crucial by both academics
and policymakers (Islam and Gronlund 2010; World Bank
2014).  The argument adopted in this paper is that the
relationship between a citizen and the state is complex and
multifaceted; it involves simultaneous trust and distrust as
separate dimensions, and such coexistence is not only com-
monplace but can be highly productive (Lewicki et al. 1998). 
In this view, trust and distrust are not alternatives, at opposite
ends of a continuum; rather, they coexist as separate dimen-
sions of the same relationship—frequently in tension, subject
to change as the relationship matures and its scope expands,
and irreducible to some average sentiment.  These ideas have
their foundations in Luhmann’s (1979) work, which conceives
of trust and distrust in terms of what they do.  For Luhmann,
they are functionally equivalent means to reduce uncertainty
and complexity because they produce confident positive or
confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct,
although trust does so more cost efficiently than distrust in
psychological terms.
For example, an individual may have high trust in her govern-
ment’s ability to manage fiscal policy and provide for her
pension, but distrust it in other ways owing to, say, a poor
experience with its error-prone administrative systems.  This
ambivalence, and the tension it produces, can be productive
if it prompts the pension recipient to check her statements to
guard against processing errors.  Furthermore, the dimensions
of the relationship may expand, for example, if she decides to
invest in government bonds, and it will mature over time so
that she has a better understanding of when she can trust the
government and when she should exhibit caution and take
precautions.  On the other hand, if a new government comes
to power, the individual may experience low trust in their
fiscal management capabilities.  Combined with a distrust of
their administrative systems, which may even increase in
these uncertain conditions, the individual becomes in-
creasingly suspicious of the government’s actions.  This
research is premised on the view that these two perspectives
of ambivalence and suspicion are crucial in explaining why
some governments are more successful than others with
introducing identity verification.  Based on this premise, the
goal of this research is to derive the social (or generative)
mechanisms that give rise to these different manifestations of
trust and distrust, that is, to identify the structures, processes,
and events that explain observed outcomes in each case
(McGrath 2013; Pawson 2000).
Research Methodology
Given this research goal, a comparative case study analysis
was undertaken.  The focal case was the problematic introduc-
tion of identity verification services in Nigeria, which was
compared with more successful implementations in Bangla-
desh and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  The research
adopted a retroductive process (Sayer 2000) within an inter-
pretivist epistemology, using both primary and secondary
data.  This involved hypothesizing the generative mechanisms
that explained initial observed outcomes, and then treating the
hypothesized mechanisms as candidate explanations that
could be refined through further empirical study (ibid.).  This
work started in August 2009 and is ongoing.  Throughout that
time, the Nigerian government has been attempting to intro-
duce identity cards with limited success.  The initial analysis
of the case revealed that low trust was significant in ex-
plaining the poor outcomes.  Further, primary and secondary
research suggested a link between trust and civil liberties
related to the use of identity cards.  Two further cases were
then selected for analysis where the adoption of biometrics,
data harmonization, and compulsory use suggested that civil
liberties were again an issue, yet the cards had been success-
fully introduced.
Initial primary data were collected at the Nigerian Identity
Management Commission (NIMC) in Abuja, and involved
interviews with the directors and staff of the commission and
their business and technical partners.  Subsequently, 15 online
and telephone interviews were conducted with Nigerian
citizens, most of whom were located in large urban areas in
different parts of the country, including Lagos, Port Harcourt,
and Abuja.  Convenience and snowball sampling (Bryman
2001) were used to identify citizen participants.  Contact was
facilitated by a member of the Nigerian cohort of international
students studying at the author’s workplace, five of whom
also participated in this study.  Further primary research
involved four meetings with academics and practitioners
experienced in the research area, including an interview with
a member of the implementation team for the UAE case. 
These findings were complemented by secondary sources,
including citizen survey data dealing with Nigeria’s develop-
ment priorities and challenges, in particular the development
goals of the proposed identity verification service.  Table 1
lists the different types of data collected and the purpose in
doing so.  All primary and secondary data were collected by
the author, except item 1, which was undertaken by a research
assistant working under the author’s supervision in the early
stages of this research.3
3The research assistant was a Nigerian national funded by a grant awarded to
the author of this paper (as Principal Investigator) by the Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council.
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Table 1.  Data Sources
No. Date Purpose Data Type
1 Summer 2009
Autumn 2010
To determine the proposed develop-
ment objectives of the Nigerian identity
verification service and monitor
progress of the implementation
Interview records (35) and observation notes (7)




As above, for comparison purposes. 
Also to monitor over time NIMC’s
interaction with the general public
about the proposed new service
Policy statements and reports from NIMC’s website.  The
official website address is https://www.nimc.gov.ng.  
Reports, policy statements, press releases, etc. can be
found under the Media and Resources tabs.  
3 Autumn 2013 
Spring 2014 
Autumn 2014
To obtain details of Nigerian citizens’
awareness of and experiences with
the identity verification service
Interviews (20) with Nigerian citizens about their





To seek expert knowledge about the
nature and scope of different identity
card implementations




To monitor public perceptions about
the Nigerian identity verification
service over time
Press reports about the progress of the service (Agande
2013; Atili 2012; Eboh 2012; Ekott 2014; Emejor 2014;
Nigerian Tribune 2011; Nnanna 2011; Nwobu 2011;
Planet Biometrics 2011).
Newspapers/blogs:
Nigerian Tribune  <http://tribune.com.ng>
The Guardian  <http://ngrguardiannews,com>




To assess the possibilities for
achieving the proposed development
goals as an outcome of the identity
verification service in Nigeria
Reports by donor agencies, intergovernmental organi-
zations and Nigerian institutions about Nigeria’s
development initiatives (Agbobli and Garba 2007;
Akpobasah 2004; Anyanwu 2005; CBN 2005, 2011;
Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012; Dow 1998; Ebong
2005; EFInA 2010; Isern et al. 2009; NBS 2010, 2011;
NNPC 2004; Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007;
Sanusi 2010; UNDP 2009a; UNICEF 2007, 2012).
Academic research about financial sector and electoral
reform in Nigeria (Aburime and Alio 2009; Adesina and
Ayo 2010; Akindele 2005; Ayo et al. 2010; Ayo and
Ukpere 2010; Bada 2000, 2002; Briggs and Brooks 2011;
Ehikhamenor 2003; Kotoye 2007; McGrath and Maiye





To develop an understanding of the
historical and cultural context for the
proposed intervention
Secondary sources on the sociopolitical and economic
history of Nigeria since it gained independence from
Britain in 1960 (Achebe 1984; Cunliffe-Jones 2010; Maja-
Pearce 2010).
8 Summer 2014 To confirm initial propositions about
the developmental potential of identity
verification services
Secondary data about the introduction of identity cards in
the UAE (Al-Khouri 2007; Al-Khouri 2011; Emirates
Identity Authority 2014).
9 Summer 2014 To confirm initial propositions about
the developmental potential of identity
verification services
Secondary data about the introduction of identity cards in
Bangladesh (Islam and Gronlund 2010; National Identity
Registration Wing 2014; World Bank 2011).
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Case Study Descriptions
The Nigerian Identity Verification Service
Efforts to introduce a national identity card in Nigeria have
been ongoing for more than 40 years.  In the political insta-
bility that existed in the country until 1999, none of the initial
efforts produced any useful output (Nwobu 2011).  In 2003,
a mass registration exercise took place, producing identity
cards for about 37 million of the (at that time) more than 70
million eligible citizens and legal residents.  The declared
development goals of this later project were crime control and
government administrative efficiency (NIMC 2009).  How-
ever, the project failed to achieve these outcomes owing to a
lack of necessary infrastructure to support the operational
running of the system, the inability to continuously update the
registrant database, and a variety of governance concerns
(McGrath and Maiye 2011).
The current proposal for implementing identity verification in
Nigeria involves issuing a multipurpose smart card to all
Nigerian citizens and legal residents aged 16 years and over. 
The cards will be mandated for use in financial transactions,
such as owning and operating bank accounts, and in a range
of government services, including the registration of voters,
issue of passports and driving licenses, and payment pro-
cessing of taxes, pensions, and national health insurance.  The
development goals of the current project, published by the
National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) of
Nigeria, are financial inclusion, control of crime and illegal
immigration, and improved government administrative effi-
ciency (NIMC 2009).
The current project has been managed by NIMC since 2007
and was originally due for implementation in October 2010. 
However, a dispute with the previous supplier meant that the
2010 completion date was rescheduled to 2013.  In 2012, one
of NIMC’s private partners was unable to obtain finance from
the banks (Atili 2012), causing further delays until a new
partner, MasterCard, was found.  In October 2013, the Presi-
dent ordered citizen registration to be completed by December
2014 (Agande 2013).  Yet by March 2014, only 3 million (out
of 100 million) citizens were registered (Emejor 2014), and
the identity documents were paper-based not smart cards, so
the deadline was revised again.  Furthermore, there was little
evidence of a public awareness campaign, with most partici-
pants interviewed up to that time claiming no knowledge of
the latest registration exercise (even though they lived and
worked in major urban areas such as Lagos and Port Har-
court).  Following the launch of the smart card on August 28,
2014, registration commenced as a pilot project for 13 million
citizens.  Nationwide use of the electronic cards is currently
planned for the 2019 elections (Ekott 2014).
Fingerprint biometric verification is being used to identify and
disqualify applicants who try to register more than once to
acquire multiple identities.  Each applicant is allocated a
unique national identification number (NIN).  Online data
capture and real-time update of the central database main-
tained by NIMC limit opportunities for data corruption and
manual intervention.  Discretionary procedures for verifying
identity in financial transactions should no longer be needed.4 
An updated IT infrastructure will enable integration of the
databases of several government agencies—including the
police, the Electoral Commission, the Immigration Service,
the National Population Service, and the Federal Road Safety
Commission—with the central database.  Potentially, then,
law enforcement authorities will be able to track each card-
holder’s participation in a wide range of activities, from
applying for a passport or driving license to paying for goods
and services; third party organizations, such as banks, will be
able to verify identity through the use of card reading devices
linked in real-time mode to the central database; and, since the
card will be free and mandated for use in many government
and business transactions, no applicant should be excluded on
the basis that they lack appropriate means of identification. 
In short, the proposed system promises a wide range of
development benefits, while raising the type of civil liberties
and security threats outlined earlier.
The turbulent history and minimal outputs produced by the
various efforts to implement identity cards in Nigeria have
meant that NIMC and its predecessor, the Department of
National Civic Registration (DNCR), have been subject to
considerable criticism over the years.  In 2007, several
government officials involved in the 2003 project were
indicted on fraud charges (Nnanna 2011).  While judgement
on the case was delayed on a number of occasions in the
Nigerian courts, the French supplier to the project was con-
victed in a Paris court of paying bribes to the indicted
government officials (Eboh 2012).
Two key aspects of the current project are the provision of a
payment option on the smart card, allowing it to double as a
bank card, and the goal to use the card as a voter identity card
during elections.  Thus public sentiment about the institutions
involved extends not just to government agencies but also to
financial sector organizations.  In both cases, a key consider-
ation is the prevalence of patrimonialism, that is, a system of
governance in which the ruler offers job-related favors to
subordinates in return for loyalty and support (Weber 1947)
4At present, applicants for bank accounts without formal means of identi-
fication may be asked to provide at least two references (bank officers or
account holders) who can guarantee their identities, or undergo a subjective
assessment of their origin (based on accent and local knowledge) which may
be subject to opportunistic requests for settlement by the assessor.
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and the subordinates have considerable leeway in how they
execute their duties, which can mean treating the office as an
income-generating role (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002). 
Nigerian institutions tend to demonstrate a subtype of patri-
monialism, called neo-patrimonialism, in which a patrimonial
style of governance coexists with democratic institutions
(ibid.).
In the case of the commercial banks, inadequate regulation
and a weak judicial system have been key enablers of the
patrimonial culture.  Consumers have suffered significant
losses on several occasions, seriously damaging the credibility
of the banks.  For example, following liberalization of the
industry in 1986, incompetent and often illegal practices
flourished in the poorly regulated expanding market (Bada
2000; Ebong 2005).  Even after a consolidation and recapitali-
zation exercise in 2004, regulation remained inadequate with
the result that the government replaced the leaders at eight
banks (Sanusi 2010).  More recently, in 2009, following the
global financial downturn, oil prices fell, the value of
Nigeria’s assets decreased, and investors lost heavily (ibid.). 
All major banks that survived recapitalization have adopted
e-payment systems (Ayo et al. 2010).  However, the cash in
circulation has continued to increase.  Only 30 percent of
Nigerian adults own bank accounts, the majority of whom are
obliged to do so because their salaries and benefits are
handled by the e-payment system mandated for disbursements
by the government (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012).  Such
is the concern about the volume of cash in circulation that the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced a “cashless policy”
in 2012 to limit individual cash withdrawals from banks
(Omose 2012).
In the case of the electoral authorities, the 2007 elections in
the country were declared anything but “free and fair” (BBC
2007), so that, in the aftermath, the electoral commission
(INEC) was inundated with petitions alleging widespread
corruption and other malpractice (McGrath and Maiye 2010). 
While the 2011 results were deemed much more credible
(McGrath and Maiye 2011), support for the government and
INEC waned considerably in the following years in light of
the political instability in parts of the country (Loschky 2015). 
In summary, Nigerian citizens have had a poor experience to
date with institutions involved in the identity verification
project.
The Bangladesh National Biometric Database
During 2007–2008 the Bangladeshi government built a
national biometric database following earlier failed attempts
to create a credible voter list for elections and issue voter
identity cards.  The database covers the entire voting age
population, 80 million people.  Biometric data stored for each
individual includes a digital signature, photograph, and
fingerprints.  The project was jointly funded by the Bangla-
deshi government and international donor agencies, including
the UNDP (United Nations Development Program).  It
entailed an extensive public awareness campaign and required
collaborative working among the electoral commission, the
armed forces, civil societies, religious and community leaders,
and the voters themselves.
While the initial goal was to create a reliable voter list, the
Bangladeshi government subsequently realized that it “would
as a byproduct add the capability of issuing a national ID card
to each voter and help to implement e-government initiatives
efficiently at a later time” (Islam and Gronlund 2010, p. 190). 
Thus the developmental potential of the data collected will be
realized in stages.  Although Bangladeshi law makes it an
offence to provide false information, distort the data, or make
fraudulent use of the card, legislation does not exist to protect
the privacy of the personal information stored in the database.
The broader context for this project is one in which political
instability, widespread corruption, and weak leadership had
militated against the conduct of free and fair elections since
the country gained independence in 1971.  Following violent
confrontation between the two major political groups, the
2007 election was postponed for nearly two years, while an
unelected, military-backed, interim government took power. 
A key goal of this caretaker government was to create a
reliable voter register in time for the rescheduled election in
December 2008.  This goal was achieved, a credible election
took place as planned, and donor evaluation reports declared
the project a success (for example, UNDP 2009b).
The UAE National Identity Program
The UAE national identity program began in 2003 with the
goal of registering an anticipated population of 5 million
people, about 80 percent of whom were migrant workers.  The
social marketing approach used to encourage registration had
limited success, with the result that, five years later, less than
20 percent of people had enrolled, while the population con-
tinued to grow.  Thus, in 2010, when the population exceeded
8 million, an alternative approach was adopted linking regis-
tration with the issue of residency permits which have a
maximum validity of three years.  This approach involved
publicizing the program in labor camps and at workplaces and
installing mobile registration devices in these locations to
facilitate enrollment.  These methods proved much more
successful.  The smart identity card incorporates a photo-
graph, digital signature, and fingerprint biometrics.  Currently
it is being enhanced to deliver further e-government services.
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Table 2.  Comparison of Identity Card Schemes
Nigerian Case Bangladeshi Case UAE Case
Compulsory? Yes. Yes. Yes.
Biometric smart card? Yes. Yes. Yes.













Several prior failed attempts
to introduce identity cards.
Multiple delays to the current
project.
Several prior failed attempts
to create a reliable voter list.
National id card was seen as
a by-product of the success-
ful implementation in 2008.
Prior attempt to introduce
identity cards in 2003






No, multiple initial services
including payment option,
voter id, and mandatory use
to access a wide range of
government services .
Yes, initially a voter ID card
whose potential to deliver
further services was
exploited after the database
was created.
Yes, initially linked to the
issue of residency permits,
but further services added




No, registration strategy is
not tied to time-bound event.
Yes, bounded by the require-
ment to register for the 2008
election (11-month period).
Yes, bounded by the
maximum validity of a
residency permit (3 years).
Public awareness
campaign?
Minimal before August 2014.
Current project still limited to






Extensive, publicized in labor
camps and at workplaces.
The broader context for the UAE project is one of political
stability in a nondemocratic federation of seven emirates, each
ruled by an hereditary emir.  Together, the seven emirs form
the Supreme Council, which is the highest legislative and
executive body in the land.  As such, elections are a recent
innovation in the UAE.  The first elections were held in 2006,
when about 2 percent of eligible Emirati citizens were
allowed to vote—but only to elect half of the Federal National
Council, which has an advisory role to the emirs.  At the latest
election in 2011, the government gave 12 percent of eligible
citizens the right to vote.  Nevertheless, despite widespread
political unrest across the Middle East during 2011 in the so-
called Arab Spring, the UAE remained stable, although it did
introduce Internet restrictions in 2012 to hinder the use of
social media to organize political protests (BBC 2014).
Historically, the UAE has been very dependent on oil
revenues which were used to develop public services such as
health, education, and the national infrastructure (ibid.).  More
recently, the country has developed its construction and
tourist industries, particularly in Dubai, attracting increasing
numbers of migrant workers.  Despite its conservatism in
some respects, the discourse of modernization is prevalent in
the country, not least in the business and technology sectors. 
Thus both the infrastructure and the political will exist in the
country to adopt technology innovations and, specifically, to
develop further services linked to the identity card.  A
comparison of the three cases described in this section is
provided in Table 2.
Case Analysis
Earlier, the argument was presented  that simultaneous trust
and distrust can coexist as separate dimensions of the same
relationship (Lewicki et al. 1998).  Specifically, where dis-
trust is highly likely in one dimension (for example, personal
privacy relating to compulsory use of biometric-based identity
cards), trust in other dimensions may be high or low, giving
rise to ambivalence or suspicion respectively in the relation-
ship overall.  This analysis suggests that the repeatedly poor
outcomes in the Nigerian case are the result of suspicion, that
is, negative sentiment across multiple dimensions of the
citizen–state relationship, whereas the more successful
outcomes in the Bangladesh and UAE cases result from
MIS Quarterly Vol. 40 No. 2/June 2016 491
McGrath/Identity Verification and Societal Challenges
ambivalence in the relationship.  In this paper, trust and
distrust are defined, respectively, as confident positive and
confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct
(Lewicki et al. 1998).  This section presents a comparative
analysis which outlines the manifestations of trust and distrust
in each case and explains what gives rise to such conditions
in the first place.  In this way, the question of why some
countries are more successful than others with introducing
identity verification services is addressed.
Manifestations of Sentiment about the
Nigerian Identity Verification Project
There is a stark contrast between the development benefits
highlighted by the directorate of NIMC, its business and tech-
nical partners, and strategy documents (NIMC 2007, 2009),
and perceptions in the media and among citizen participants
in this study about the likely outcomes from the Nigerian
identity verification project.  Primary and secondary data from
this study reveal that the sentiment of the former group has
remained largely positive since its inception in 2007, empha-
sizing the development benefits for citizens while presenting
implementation problems and delays as a legacy of prior
implementations by the DNCR, NIMC’s predecessor.  Never-
theless, almost all interviewees in this group mentioned the
threat of corruption, given the endemic nature of patri-
monialism at all levels in Nigerian public administration and
the fact that many staff transferred from the DNCR to NIMC
when the latter was created in 2007.  What was less apparent
in this discourse was evidence of concerted action to deal with
this threat.
By contrast, citizen participants expressed largely negative
sentiment, ranging from disappointment about the perfor-
mance of their government to cynicism about its motives for
introducing identity cards.  Referring to the 2003 implemen-
tation, one participant claimed that cards were not issued to
registrants in a state other than their state of origin, lest
funding and other resources were redistributed on the basis of
card issuances, while another claimed that numbers were
inflated at some registration centers by issuing cards to under-
age applicants.  In the independent press, the 2003 project is
frequently referred to as a “scam” (Eboh 2012; Nnanna 2011). 
When the budget for the latest implementation was announced
in 2011, criticism reemerged.  Immediate reactions in the
press described the scheme as “another white elephant”
(Nigerian Tribune 2011).  Crucially, though, the group of
citizen participants interviewed two years later, in 2013–2014,
either had no knowledge that a new registration exercise was
underway, or expressed concern, even conviction, that the
project would be a further waste of billions of naira (several
hundred million U.S. dollars).
The high profile launch of the electronic card on August 28, 
2014, in which dozens of VIPs were filmed during registra-
tion, contrasts sharply with interviewees’ experiences to ob-
tain their paper-based cards.  One participant with a personal
contact at NIMC expressed concerns about poorly planned
implementation processes.  Others highlighted limited public
awareness about the registration exercise, several hour waits
to register, and inadequate facilities (buildings, electricity
supply, etc.) for registration purposes.  Where public aware-
ness had existed among study participants prior to the launch
of the e-card, it had occurred either by word of mouth or
because a citizen had needed to renew a document which
required identity verification, for example, a driving license. 
While the August 2014 launch heightened the profile of the
project, it also introduced a new dimension because the e-card
is branded with the MasterCard logo.  Protests across the
country expressed outrage that the biometrics of Nigerian
citizens would be shared with a U.S.-based corporation which
would also benefit financially from having access to over 100
million customers (Ekott 2014).  Thus, concerns about threats
to civil liberties assumed a major role, along with fears that,
if implemented, the benefits of the service would not accrue
to Nigerians themselves.
In short, not only has there been a lack of public confidence
in NIMC’s ability to deliver the system, but also a feeling that
political will to prosecute endemic fraud on the project was
lacking (Nigerian Tribune 2011).  In effect, public sentiment
has been one of suspicion of institutions and their leaders
resulting from poor project outcomes enabled by weak
governance systems.  As their annual reports have made clear,
NIMC’s management team were aware of “the very deep
cynicism” (NIMC 2010, p. 14) in the country and the need to
build public confidence in the system in light of past experi-
ence.  However, their response to criticism has been less than
transparent and accountable.  Between 2007 and 2010, a high
degree of secrecy was maintained about the actual status of
the project until the October 2010 implementation date was
passed, when it became necessary to acknowledge that mini-
mal development work had taken place in the previous three
years.  As late as spring 2014, there was little evidence of a
public awareness campaign, even among well-educated parti-
cipants from major urban areas.  In short, policymakers’
claims about the development potential of the service seem to
be underpinned by the common assumption in e-government
research in DCs that if they do a competent job on the tech-
nical task, trust will follow (Avgerou et al. 2009).
The Roots of Suspicion
The coexistence of low trust and high distrust between
Nigerian citizens and their institutions is a very undesirable
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situation in which individuals express little or no reason for
confidence in the implementation of the identity verification
service and ample reason for skepticism and, indeed, cynicism
about the declared development goals.  Their experience with
earlier and current efforts to introduce identity cards has been
plagued by corrupt and incompetent practice, yet minimal
action has been taken to identify those responsible and hold
them accountable.  Almost as soon as identity cards were
issued from the 2003 project, they fell out of use, once reali-
zation surfaced of the static and inaccurate nature of the data
collected.  There is little evidence so far that the latest imple-
mentation will instill the confidence that is lacking.  Far from
creating a nationwide awareness campaign to publicize the
new service, and educate citizens in the potentialities of the
card and the situations in which it can or must be used, the
implementation team provided minimal information about the
progress of the project between 2007 and 2014.  Thus, imple-
mentation experience to date is a significant contributor to the
non-conducive context for this initiative since it does not
provide reasons for positive expectations about the conduct of
those responsible for delivering the service.
However, the absence of positive expectations coexists with
negative expectations that undesirable events will occur. 
Development outcomes claimed for the use of the identity
verification service include financial inclusion, resulting from
increased access to consumer credit, and more representative
election results, resulting from a reliable voter register (NIMC
2007, 2009).  However, Nigerian citizens’ experiences with
their elections and their banks (Bada 2002; Ehikhamenor
2003; McGrath and Maiye 2010) at the very best leave room
for wariness, and in most cases, skepticism and cynicism
prevail (Loschky 2015).  European Union observers at the
2007 elections alleged that they were the worst they had
witnessed in any country, and even though the 2011 elections
restored some confidence among the electorate, support for
the government had nearly halved by 2014 (ibid.).  Further-
more, INEC continued to engage in identity capture and data
storage independently of NIMC, to the extent that it issued its
own biometric voter cards for the 2015 elections.  Yet, this
approach also has been problematic.  With only weeks to go,
the country’s national security adviser urged INEC to post-
pone the election for up to three months, since 30 million
cards had still to be distributed (BBC 2015b).  In the end, it
was postponed for six weeks and resulted in defeat for the
incumbent government—the first time in Nigeria’s history
that an opposition candidate was successful in a presidential
election (BBC 2015a).
Suspicion of the banks is also crucial, given the inclusion of
a payment option on the card.  For years, weak governance
has allowed borrowers to renege on their loans, knowing that
the banks were unlikely to pursue them in court given the
slow and expensive nature of Nigeria’s legal process (Sanusi
2010).  Some borrowers have done this repeatedly with
different banks (Ebong 2005) since the country lacks the
infrastructure to establish credit ratings for borrowers and a
standardized address system for authenticating demographic
data.  While the owners and managers of the failed banks and
their bad debtors escaped prosecution, small savers lost
heavily, eroding their trust in the formal system (EFInA
2010).  Indeed, 65 percent of the economically active popula-
tion is served by the informal financial sector or financially
excluded, rising to 98 percent in rural areas (CBN 2005,
2011).  The poor, especially, tend to keep their savings as
“resources in kind” (CBN 2005) and continue to engage in
cash-based transactions.  Those who choose to save and
borrow in the informal financial sector find the available
products more suitable to their needs in terms of simplicity,
interest rate levels, and little or no need for collateral they
would be unable to provide (Komolafe 2011; Umoh 2006). 
Furthermore, high participation in the formal sector is better
explained by compulsion than confidence in some cases, such
as government workers who own bank accounts because this
is the means of payment for their salaries.
Lamido Sanusi was appointed Governor of the CBN, in June
2009, for a five-year term in the middle of the world financial
crisis.  He was an internationally acclaimed banker who came
to office with a radical anti-corruption agenda and spoke
publicly about citizens’ lack of trust in Nigerian banks on
several occasions (for example, Sanusi 2010).  However, he
was suspended from office by the President in February 2014
after exposing a $20 billion fraud committed in the state-
owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC)
involving ministers in the President’s regime.  One of the
citizen participants in this study pointed to Sanusi’s suspen-
sion as further reason for skepticism that Nigerian banks were
becoming more trustworthy, and, as in the case of the
elections, this view of institutions in the country was widely
shared (Ross 2014).
Summarizing so far, secure reliable means of identification
are a necessary and legitimate requirement for individuals to
claim their right of citizenship and access associated public
and business services.  There can be few who would argue
that financial inclusion, reliable voter registration, and other
benefits claimed for the introduction of identity verification
services are desirable outcomes for Nigerian citizens.  How-
ever, conditions in Nigeria are not conducive to the introduc-
tion of such a service.  Instrumental freedoms (Sen 1999) are
lacking, in particular, the social arrangements called trans-
parency guarantees, which allow individuals to interact with
others on some basic presumption of trust.  So is Nigeria a
special case?  How have identity verification services been
successfully implemented elsewhere, for example, in Bangla-
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desh and the United Arab Emirates, and what constitutes a
conducive context for such a service?
The Bangladesh National Biometric Database
Islam and Gronlund (2010) analyze the success factors asso-
ciated with building a national biometric database in
Bangladesh in 2008 following earlier failed attempts to do so. 
The database covers the entire voting age population, 80
million people, and was built with the goal of creating a
credible voter list for elections.  The Bangladeshi government
subsequently realized that the database could be used to
produce a national ID card for each voter and provide the
basis for implementing e-government services in the future. 
Islam and Gronlund ask if this project is a transferable
success.  Clearly, there are similarities with the Nigerian case:
a history of political instability, entrenched corruption and
weak governance, and past failure to implement the project. 
However, there are also some crucial differences.  The project
was implemented under a military-backed interim government
in a “politically controlled environment” in which there were
“positive exercises of power and politics” (ibid., p. 200).  As
Islam and Gronlund suggest, strong political regimes might
accept such an approach, but it is less transferable to a weak
democracy.  Nigeria is the latter case (Kelsall 2011), and a
key contributor to its weakness is the size of and rivalry
between its two main ethnic groups, split almost 50:50 within
the population.
Other important differences between the Bangladeshi and
Nigerian cases are also apparent.  First, creating a credible
voter register followed by a free and fair election was a pre-
condition in Bangladesh for the restoration of democracy, and
a massive awareness campaign ensured that citizens were
informed of the need to register.  By contrast, return to a
democratic dispensation occurred in Nigeria in 1999 and has
remained so since, notwithstanding the terrorist activities of
Boko Haram in the north of the country.  Second, the Bangla-
deshi project was more limited than the Nigerian one,
focusing only on a voter list with an ID card as a by-product,
increasing confidence that it could be achieved in a reason-
able timescale.  In Nigeria, the initiative aims to harmonize
the databases of several government agencies as well as
including a payment option on the smart card.  Third, NIMC
publicizes financial inclusion as a goal of the Nigerian
initiative.  Aside from the high distrust in Nigerian banks, the
benefits to Nigeria’s “unbanked” of the payment option on the
card will be limited, for although the card will be free to all
citizens, the services planned for delivery will not be.  A
crucial issue for Nigeria’s financially excluded is obtaining
small loans without collateral (Komolafe 2011).  In Bangla-
desh, alternative arrangements exist to provide such loans to
the poor.  The Grameen Bank is a high profile example, which
together with its founder, Muhammad Yunus, won a Nobel
Peace Prize in 2006.
In short, it seems clear that the political will existed in
Bangladesh in 2008 to make the national biometric database
a success, aided by support from donor agencies, including
the UNDP.  However, Islam and Gronlund’s account is
tempered not just by comment about the politically controlled
environment, but also about the need for citizen trust in
e-government services.  In effect, this initiative may be seen
as one that ultimately built trust (that a successful implemen-
tation would be achieved and the democracy restored), but
such trust coexisted with distrust (not least, concerns about
the security of the data and how the government might use it),
which necessitated political control by a military-backed
regime in order to collect it.  As in the case of the pension
recipient mentioned earlier in this paper, this trust/distrust
combination is one in which the parties have separate as well
as shared objectives, hence it can be beneficial to both if their
interdependence is suitably bounded (Lewicki et al. 1998). 
Whether and how such bounding is maintained in Bangladesh
in the longer term is an open question.  Indeed, further
research could usefully explore how the relationship between
Bangladeshi citizens and institutions unfolds over time.
The UAE National Identity Program
Al-Khouri’s (2011) study of the successful implementation of
the UAE national ID program presents an alternative context–
mechanism–outcome configuration.  The political regime in
the UAE is a federation of seven emirates, each ruled by an
hereditary emir.  In this case, the right to vote is limited to a
small percentage of the eligible population who can elect
advisors to the emirs only.  Thus, the impetus for the intro-
duction of the UAE national ID card was not linked to the
creation of an eligible voter list.  Rather the issue was national
security, given the political instability among some of the
UAE’s neighbors and its high ratio of expatriate workers of
approximately 5:1 when compared with Emirati citizens.  This
initiative got off to a slow start in 2003 until changes were
made to the registration process.  A key revision was to link
registration for the card with the issue and renewal of resi-
dency permits, which run for a maximum of three years,
creating a time-bound plan for data collection.  In this way,
support was enlisted from the Ministry of the Interior
(including the immigration suthorities and the police force),
the Ministry of Health (since medical fitness certificates are
needed to complete the residency procedures) and the
Ministry of Labor.  In short, the development goal in this case
was neither about franchise nor financial inclusion, but con-
cerned the more fundamental freedom of establishing one’s
right to reside in a country.
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As in the Bangladeshi case, the UAE ID card project worked
to a time-bound plan for registration with coordinated action
across several ministries; it was implemented by a stable non-
democratic political regime, with support from the immigra-
tion authorities and the police; and it separated the delivery of
the basic facilities to support national security from the
delivery of e-government services.  The UAE initiative had a
strong theme of development as modernization, with a key
focus on the use of information technology.  Indeed, the
identity commission of the country is now expanding the
range of services it offers to citizens, including the use of apps
on smart phones.  Such an approach makes the most of the
well-developed infrastructure in the country, although it
contrasts significantly with the more traditional style of
government, which is making much slower progress toward
participation.  Again, though, a workable combination of trust
and distrust was achieved in this case, despite the significant
differences between the political, social, and economic
contexts of the UAE and Bangladesh, a combination that is
not yet being achieved in Nigeria.
Consolidating Empirical Findings
on Identity Verification
The consolidating concept among these empirical observa-
tions is the manifestation of trust and distrust in the citizen–
state relationship.  In the UAE and Bangladeshi cases, this
manifestation was ambivalence, in which the shared goal of
restoring democracy or ensuring national security generated
sufficient levels of trust in a successful implementation out-
come to enable the introduction of identity cards.  Further-
more, citizens were aware that the authorities intended to
enforce registration and, therefore, that resistance would be
penalized.  In the Nigerian case, there is limited evidence of
belief in a successful implementation and a wide-ranging set
of development goals which make achieving a workable level
of trust among citizens an uphill struggle.  Combined with
high levels of distrust about the institutions involved, what
manifests itself is not ambivalence but skepticism (that this
initiative will again be undermined by corruption) without
reassurance (that measures are in place to deal with such
threats)—in short, suspicion.
What are the mechanisms that give rise to the necessary level
of trust to convert suspicion about identity verification into
ambivalence, and what practical implications does this have
for the Nigerian case?  First, the evidence suggests the impor-
tance of a circumscribed development goal, which is widely
publicized, broadly shared, and achievable in the short term. 
In the Nigerian case, the wide range of development goals
from financial inclusion to immigration control tend to
confuse rather than provide a means for consensus, height-
ening speculation about the government’s real agenda. 
Distrust of the government’s motives, particularly around
issues of security and privacy, is a reality for the introduction
of identity verification in any country.  Experience from the
Bangladeshi and UAE cases suggests that such negative
expectations can coexist with goals that generate positive
sentiment, such as political freedoms and national security. 
However, to generate such sentiment, citizens in all parts of
the country must be made aware of what is planned, how it
will be achieved, and what it means for them, which will
involve recruiting appropriate civil society support, for
example, from religious and community leaders.
Second, the logistics of registering 100 million citizens, many
of whom live in remote rural and even hostile terrain, coupled
with Nigeria’s infrastructure problems, make registration a
huge task.  Success seems more likely if this task is attempted
separately from the provision of financial and e-government
services.  Until recently, NIMC was attempting to register all
citizens by the end of 2014, but completion of registration has
now been delayed until 2018 in time for the 2019 elections
(Ekott 2014).  Potentially, this approach could represent a first
stage of the project, as in Bangladesh, with services to follow
at a later date, although it seems unlikely that MasterCard,
NIMC’s business partner for the payment option on the card,
will want to wait that long.  Furthermore, cooperation be-
tween NIMC and INEC would need to move on from its
current position of independent operation.  Whether registra-
tion is coordinated with the production of a voter list or not,
lessons from the UAE and Bangladesh suggest that time-
bounding it with an important, or necessary, event for citizens
is a successful strategy.
Third, and crucially, strong governance is a key determinant
of success.  Although Nigeria is seen as a weak democracy,
if NIMC, as the institution responsible for identity verifica-
tion, establishes its credibility, then trust in this initiative
seems likely to increase.  Indeed, Avgerou (2013) shows how
the Brazilian people came to trust their electoral authorities
and as a result successfully implemented an e-voting system,
despite their distrust of politicians and public administration
more widely.  However, NIMC is unlikely to achieve such
trust without the kind of active public engagement evident in
the Bangladeshi and UAE cases.
Conclusion
This research was premised on the view that ambivalence and
suspicion are crucial concepts in explaining why some
governments are more successful than others with introducing
identity verification services.  In this context, ambivalence is
defined as coexistent trust and distrust toward a single target,
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while suspicion implies only negative sentiments (such as
skepticism, cynicism, distrust)  across all dimensions of the
relationship (Lewicki et al. 1998).  Based on this premise, the
goal of this research was to derive the social (or generative)
mechanisms that give rise to these different manifestations of
trust and distrust, that is, to identify the structures, processes,
and events that explain empirical observations in different
identity verification cases.  As such, the research had theo-
retical and practical intent.
The findings from this research are that ambivalence is an
appropriate concept for explaining the successful introduction
of identity verification services.  Realistically, such services
will always generate some distrust among citizens due to the
amount of personal data they are required to disclose to
powerful executive and legislative bodies.  Nevertheless,
identity verification is a necessary and legitimate requirement
for individuals to benefit from both the services offered in a
country and the security of residency rights within it—
opportunities and capabilities which contribute to their
development.  Therefore, it is appropriate to consider how
such verification can be achieved, particularly in countries
where secure, reliable means of identification are not com-
monplace.  This research traced the outcomes from a, to-date,
unsuccessful attempt to introduce such a service in Nigeria 
and then analyzed two further cases to identify the structures
and processes that led to the necessary trust-building for
successful outcomes after initially unpromising beginnings. 
The consolidating concept among these cases was the trust/
distrust combination that prevailed between the institutions
responsible for the initiatives and the citizens intended to
benefit from them.  These tendencies manifested themselves
as suspicion in the Nigerian case and as ambivalence in the
more successful cases.  The social mechanisms that accounted
for these outcomes were concerned with the structures and
processes through which a circumscribed, time-bound devel-
opment goal for the service was established; appropriate
institutional and civil society support was enrolled; and
confidence was built in the responsible authorities through a
citizen engagement strategy. 
The theoretical implications of this research take the form of
rudimentary propositions which may be refined in further
empirical studies.  First, ambivalence toward identity verifi-
cation services is not just productive in ensuring a successful
implementation, but also necessary to ensure ongoing use. 
Such ambivalence is produced in the tension between the
security and privacy concerns of the registrants and the
positive sentiment generated by government strategies to raise
public awareness, build confidence in institutions, and address
broadly shared development goals.  Such strategies are neces-
sary during both implementation and use.  Second, the
absence of ambivalence is likely to give rise to problems with
identity verification in implementation or use, irrespective of
whether it results from positive or negative sentiment across
the related dimensions of the citizen–state relationship.  In
either case, one may argue that the citizen’s response is
blind—either blind trust or blind suspicion (Lewicki et al.
1998).  Hence necessary monitoring, confidence building, and
consensus seeking strategies are likely to be largely absent,
and even unsought, leaving the service open to manipulation
and abuse.  Third, a growing body of ICTD research is
informed by Sen’s (1999) capability framework which
postulates a link between services and observable outcomes
through the concept of capabilities, or notions of freedom that
allow people to live lives of their choosing (De' 2007;
Hatakka and Lagsten 2012; Kleine et al. 2012; Zheng and
Walsham 2008).  However, just as trust coexists with distrust
toward a single target and the two may be combined in a
productive relationship, so freedom coexists with unfreedom,
and again, the two can work together to achieve a particular
development outcome.  Such coexistence is evident in the
notion of developmental patrimonialism (Kelsall 2011), which
is used to describe regimes where rapid and poverty-reducing
growth has taken place under strong leadership which, never-
theless, tolerated and controlled processes of economic rent-
seeking, while remaining oriented toward the long term.  In
short, some of the generative mechanisms identified in this
paper as causal explanations of empirical observations contain
coercive elements, yet outcomes such as the restoration of
democracy in a country are widely perceived as bringing
development benefits for citizens.  Societal challenges such
as those discussed in this paper raise ethical and moral dilem-
mas, opening up an area of information systems research that
has received limited attention to date.
Further empirical studies on identity verification might also
take the following research directions.  First, the mechanisms
identified may be unpacked further.  In any societal level
study, one risks missing or smoothing away important
contextual details in an aggregation process.  A focus on key
groups within the society may reveal the presence of other
mechanisms which at a societal level cancel each other out. 
Second, this research focused on two key objectives of the
Nigerian identity card project:  financial inclusion and reliable
voter registration.  However, there are a number of other
objectives, such as tackling crime and illegal immigration,
each of which merit a study in their own right.  There is scope
for comparative studies of identity card projects and their
related development goals.  Some initial comparisons with
projects in the UAE and Bangladesh have been made that
merit more detailed investigation.  Brazil is a frequently cited
example in Nigerian policy documents, suggesting a place
where further work might be progressed.  Finally, identity
verification services are justified by governments on the basis
of achieving two broad goals:  supporting national security
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and improving access to services.  In the longer term, then,
findings from this stream of work may contribute to wider
research domains such as e-government.
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